BORDER PROTECTION LEGISLATION AMENDMENT (DETERRENCE OF ILLEGAL FOREIGN FISHING) BILL 2005: Second Reading

Mr McCLELLAND  (Barton) (9.56 a.m.) —As I mentioned when I last debated the Border Protection Legislation Amendment (Deterrence of Illegal Foreign Fishing) Bill 2005, illegal foreign fishing is a great threat to Australia's fisheries resources and to the sustainability of local economies dependent on these resources throughout the nation. Illegal foreign fishing, however, also raises questions about broader issues of border protection.

Better protection of Australia's maritime interests is fundamental to Australia's economic interests and, indeed, to our national security. However, effective national security means much more than simply introducing legislation in the federal parliament. Effective national security programs need to be driven with focus and determination at the federal government level. For instance, between 1 July 2004 and 20 January 2005 there were some 4,122 recorded sightings of foreign fishing vessels in the Australian fishing zone. Of those only 107 were apprehended, 94 of which were subjected to administrative seizure— that is, a process of boarding a foreign fishing vessel, confiscating its stock and fishing equipment and then releasing the crew and the vessel without charge only for them to return on another day. [start page 10]

To date the Howard government has attempted to solve the problem of illegal foreign fishing in Australian waters by dedicating only one vessel, the Oceanic Viking, with one machine gun, to patrol the Southern Ocean. Although the government announced that this vessel would operate for two years from July 2004, it did not even complete sea trials until December 2004, almost six months late. To date the government has made no commitment to continue the operation of the Oceanic Viking when funding to lease it runs out in 15 months time. And, I might add, our eight vessels attached to the marine unit of Customs are not equipped with the same armament as the Oceanic Viking has, nor does it appear that the same training is being provided to boarding crews of these Customs vessels that is being provided to crews of the Oceanic Viking.

The opposition has nothing but praise for the crew of the Oceanic Viking in deterring illegal fishing in Australia's fishing zone around Heard and McDonald islands. In fact, just last week the Oceanic Viking investigated six vessels fishing illegally on the BANZARE Bank around the edge of the Antarctic ice shelf, which has been closed to fishing by the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources since 14 February 2005. The opposition supports efforts by the government to protect the valuable fishing stocks and, regrettably, endangered fishing stocks in the fragile ecosystem of the Southern Ocean by bringing all nations with vessels involved in fishing these waters in line with the CCAMLR. Given the number of recorded sightings of illegal foreign fishing vessels in Australian waters—there were some 4,122 in the period that I referred to—it is quite obvious that we do not have anywhere near enough hulls on the water to protect Australia's valuable fishing stocks and broader maritime security interests.

Although the Oceanic Viking patrols the Southern Ocean, no similarly equipped vessel, as I have indicated, is dedicated to patrolling the vast ocean expanses of Australia's northern coastline. We have eight Customs vessels and 14 naval patrol boats. If, by analogy, we equate the distance that they must cover of the economic zone surrounding Australia, it represents roughly 50 police cars to patrol the whole of Australia. There is no way we could manage effective law enforcement of the whole of Australia with 50 police cars. Obviously, there is a much greater population on land and many more events, but that analogy starkly brings into focus just how inadequate our broader security arrangements are when you are talking about, essentially, 14 naval patrol boats and eight Customs vessels that are the hulls on the water—the interdiction force.

With regard to the effectiveness of the interdiction force, I note that the Minister for Defence recently was quoted as saying that the Navy does not, under its rules of engagement, have power or authorisation to fire at vessels illegally fishing in our economic zone. While those rules of engagement are—and appropriately should remain—confidential, I was surprised that those rules of engagement appear to restrict the Navy from implementing the full force of Commonwealth law. In particular, with respect to fisheries, section 84 of the Fisheries Management Act empowers officers of the Commonwealth to use appropriate force to stop an illegal foreign fishing vessel. In particular, paragraph 2, subsection 1 of section 84 specifically authorises officers of the Commonwealth to use any reasonable means consistent with international law to stop the boat, including firing at or into the boat after firing a warning shot and using a device to prevent or impede use of the system for propelling the boat—in other words, to aim at its propulsion mechanism, which is an appropriate attempt. But our Customs vessels are not equipped with any fixed armament, let alone a basic cannon, that would enable them to fire either a precise warning shot across the bows of a foreign fishing vessel or a precisely targeted shot into the propulsion mechanism of an illegal foreign fishing vessel.

Mr Prosser interjecting

Mr McCLELLAND —I note the comment by my colleague that the vessels should have that, and they certainly should. Obviously from a political point of view, the opposition proposed before the last federal election that there be an Australian coastguard where these inadequacies could have been remedied—indeed, effectively doubling the capacity of the marine unit of Customs by adding another eight vessels. Even if you do not accept or agree with Labor's policy for a dedicated coastguard, as a matter of logic there needs to be much more work done in coordinating the legislation and the powers that are given to officers of the Commonwealth to intercept vessels, board vessels and apprehend persons on those vessels. There also appears to be a need to bring the rules of engagement of our naval vessels, in particular, into line with Commonwealth law. Certainly a much greater effort needs to be made to put hulls on the water and to upgrade the armament on our Customs vessels. The government preaches as a mantra border protection, but when we look at the facts—we have the equivalent of 50 police patrol cars as our current interdiction capacity in such a massive zone around our nation—we see how sparsely spread our current border protection is. The situation needs to be redressed. (Time expired)