Mr McCLELLAND (Barton) (5.09 p.m.)—The opposition supports the second reading of the Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Bill 2005, which will go some way towards enhancing accountability and oversight of Australia’s intelligence agencies. There can be no doubt that the gathering and analysis of intelligence is at the front line of the fight against terrorism. As we feel the shockwaves of yet another bombing in Bali it is appropriate to once again stress that Australia, along with our friends in the region and across the globe, is well and truly involved in that fight. It is appropriate that yesterday the parliament yet again confirmed our determination to win that fight.

As Mr Philip Flood, in the 2004 report following his inquiry into Australia’s intelligence agencies, stated:

Increasingly, that intelligence will be not only for military purposes but also for regional law enforcement purposes. Labor entirely supports the significant additional funding that has been provided to our intelligence agencies over the past four years, which is now in the order of $4 billion. The Leader of the Opposition in a speech to the Sydney Institute given on 4 August this year said:

More recently, as a practical measure to encourage talented young Australians to enter a career in our intelligence agencies and  in our defences forces, the opposition has proposed that scholarships should be offered to pay the HECS debts of young graduates who have joined our major security agencies. The opposition has proposed that scholarships would apply to ASIO, ASIS, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and the Department of Defence, including defence intelligence agencies. These are the agencies that form the heart of our preventive efforts of intelligence gathering, surveillance, investigation and detection. It is these agencies that need ready access to the best and brightest of our youth. Under Labor’s proposals, up to 200 Australian scholarships would be offered to eligible graduates entering participating agencies each year. These scholarships would pay any outstanding HECS debt for an eligible graduate at the time they are granted permanent employment. The scholarships would cost up to $8 million each year and, based on today’s graduate intakes, would cover all graduates entering the agencies.

A return-of-service type obligation would require that the graduates be employed within a participating agency for a suitable period of years—for instance, based on the period of study for which the HECS debt has been paid. A graduate in Asian studies and languages, for instance, beginning work with one of our security agencies or a science and technology graduate, such as a signals analyst recruited by the defence intelligence agencies, could receive in the order of $20,000 in satisfaction of their entire HECS debt. We believe this is a practical measure that can go some significant way to strengthening the human resources of our intelligence community at a time when these human resources need to be the strongest we can possibly make them. Government agencies which keep Australia safe should be able to attract the very best young graduates to assist in protecting Australia and our region from the threat of terrorism.

I note media reports from yesterday of an impending publication from the Kokoda Foundation prepared substantially by Professor Ross Babbage. The report refers to a recommendation not dissimilar to that which Labor has proposed. Apparently it will be suggested in the publication that tertiary students who do 12 months full-time military training and commit to six years follow-up annual training would have their tertiary study entirely paid by Defence. The author believes these young graduates would provide a highly trained, ready reinforcement for the permanent Defence Force. Clearly, that is an idea that is worth exploring, but Labor believes these sorts of innovative measures should extend across not only our Defence Force but also our crucial intelligence agencies.

I also commend to members an excellent contribution to this debate made by newly elected Senator Trood. Senator Trood noted the numerous references in the Flood report to potential value adding to intelligence and national security assessments through greater agency contact with the public and experts outside those agencies. As Senator Trood noted:

Senator Trood argued that greater interaction between the agencies and academia is essential for a number of reasons including, to use his words, ‘the intelligence shortcomings over Iraq’.

I recently received a submission from an academic arguing for the formalisation of an exchange program between universities and our intelligence agencies. It goes without saying that national security considerations would have to be recognised in such a formalised exchange program. Nevertheless, refreshing the ranks of agencies on the one hand and providing practical interchange with students on the other would, to use the words of the Flood inquiry, significantly value add to our intelligence-gathering capacity.

I note that Senator Trood also criticised the fact that there is currently no one agency that provides an effective strategic view of longer term global trends that may impact on Australia’s security and foreign policy interests. That, we believe, is a valid criticism and one that needs to be addressed.

I note in that context that in the House yesterday the Leader of the Opposition noted the interchange between the Australian Federal Police and policing agencies in South-East Asia which were particularly successful in, for instance, apprehending a number of those responsible for the Bali bombings of October 2002. The Leader of the Opposition noted, however, that there has not been a similar level of interchange between our intelligence agencies. Obviously, there will be particular strategic interests between our countries that may limit the extent of communication in respect of a limited number of issues. However, the opposition believe that when it comes to the war on terror those limitations can be overcome. We believe that more work needs to be done to build up those crucial inter intelligence agency links.

In particular, the Leader of the Opposition referred to the ease of movement throughout the South-East Asian archipelagos and the fact that the waterways are essentially a highway for travel between those islands and indeed between nation-states. When I visited the United States Coast Guard last year, they recognised the waterways as a highway not only for criminals, including drug use and illegal smuggling of all kinds, but also for potential terrorist activity.

I note that the American agencies, through the Joint Interagency Task Force West—which involves not only the United States Coast Guard but also the United States military and the FBI—are providing valuable resources to South-East Asian countries, including resources and training to improve their maritime intelligence links. We believe that is a project that Australia could be much more closely involved in. As was put to us when we visited the Joint Interagency Task Force West, Australia would have perhaps an even greater capacity to open doors in South-East Asia. The Joint Interagency Task Force West indicated that they would welcome Australia’s involvement in some of the projects that they are involved in. The point I am making is that I am far from convinced, and the opposition is far from convinced, that we are doing all that we can to establish appropriate intelligence links, which are essential if we are to defeat terrorism in South-East Asia.

I note that after the Bali bombings in 2002 the then head of ASIO, Mr Dennis Richardson, described the bombings as an ‘intelligence failure’. Similarly, to use that expression—not, I stress, in a judgmental sense but in a descriptive sense—last week’s bombings in Bali must also be regarded as an intelligence failure. Again, I want to stress that we are advancing that statement not to be judgmental or as a criticism of anyone’s neglect or culpability but rather as an indication that things could be improved.

These measures are some of the things that could be done, we believe, to strengthen intelligence gathering not only as it affects our nation but as it affects our region—a region which is our backyard, from the point of view of potential threats. These threats are coming from our backyard well and truly into our front yard.

After that quite wide-ranging analysis, it is appropriate to refer to the detailed provisions of the bill, not in the same extent of detail that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for the Environment and Heritage employed in his contribution but by way of outline. As previously indicated, the bill arises, firstly, from recommendations of the Flood inquiry of 2004 into Australia’s intelligence agencies and, secondly, from a review conducted by the government of the operation of the original 2001 legislation.

The government has also acknowledged the contribution of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, which the opposition would also like to formally acknowledge in recognising the parliament’s respect for that committee. That committee has made an outstanding contribution to the national security debate in Australia. As the parliamentary secretary pointed out, it is significant that each of its reports has been unanimous.

In terms of picking up some of the recommendations of the Flood report, it cannot go without mention that a significant cause of the problem that we and our allies are facing in Iraq was the intelligence failures that preceded the invasion of Iraq, intelligence failures that resulted in poor planning. In one section of the Flood report, Mr Flood said:

that is, the briefings on the existence of weapons of mass destruction—

Again, I stress that I sincerely believe that a lot of the problems facing those countries participating in Iraq are a result of the poor planning resulting from the poor intelligence assessments as to what was going to be required in the vacuum created by the removal of Saddam Hussein from the leadership of that country. Irrespective of which side of the debate you are on as to whether the invasion was or was not appropriate, those who are thoughtful in this area will recognise those intelligence failures and will recognise that inadequate and insufficient planning was undertaken as to how to deal with the vacuum created once Saddam Hussein was removed from office. Quite frankly, I think the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia are still trying to fathom what to do to fill that vacuum. Again, that goes back to the intelligence failures, not simply those about the existence or non-existence of the weapons of mass destruction but the inadequate intelligence assessment and advice about that crucial issue—that is, what would happen in the post Saddam Hussein vacuum.

In terms of the specific details of the bill, suffice it to say that the bill is intended to improve the effectiveness of oversight and accountability mechanisms of our overseas intelligence agencies, as well as to more effectively address the current division of responsibilities between those agencies. Importantly, the measures also provide a legislative basis for the activities of the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation, a relatively new organisation but one that is vitally important to our national security interests, given the extent of the coastline that we are responsible for protecting. While the DIGO, like ASIS and the DSD, has a foreign intelligence focus, its ability to obtain imagery and geospatial data will assist Australian defence forces in their exercises and training wherever they occur. It should be noted that the technology can also be a valuable tool to assist in search and rescue operations.

The opposition support—also with appropriate safeguards—the provisions in this bill for these technologies to be used to produce intelligence to support Commonwealth and state authorities in their national security role. The opposition also support measures in the bill to expand the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, which will now be appropriately renamed to include the additional agencies and will have its numbers increased from seven to nine. We note that the government has moved amendments in the Senate to adopt recommendations of the parliamentary joint committee that the deputy chair’s position should be occupied by an opposition member except in the circumstances outlined by the parliamentary secretary. Again, we believe that that amendment is appropriate.

We are disappointed, however, that the government has not accepted opposition amendments which are based on the unanimous recommendations of the joint standing committee. In particular, our amendments which were moved in the Senate were proposed in order to address concerns expressed by that committee about item 22 of the bill. That item proposes the removal of the qualifying words currently contained in section 8(1)(a)(i) of the primary act, in respect of ministerial directions: specifically, removing from those provisions the requirement for such authorisations to be obtained for the purpose of obtaining intelligence on an Australian person ‘who is overseas’. It is those words ‘who is overseas’ that will be removed.

Despite some ambiguity, the joint standing committee noted that, arguably, removal of those words could be interpreted as expanding the powers of the agencies to collect intelligence on Australians who are in Australia. While acknowledging that there may be circumstances in which it may be necessary for our overseas intelligence agencies to collect intelligence on Australians in Australia—for instance, if an Australian is communicating with an overseas organisation or person that presents a security concern—the opposition shares the committee’s concerns that the same approval regime that currently applies to ASIO in respect of its obtaining of intelligence on Australians within Australia should also apply to overseas intelligence agencies undertaking that function. In particular, the committee recommended that the ministerial authorisation regime should ‘generally replicate the provisions of and have identical authorisation provisions to those that apply to ASIO’.

In the opposition’s view, the ASIO warrant procedures that apply to its telecommunication interception powers are comparable to the powers that will be given to our overseas intelligence agencies under this legislation. On that basis, we have again proposed similar amendments in the House. We will also be moving an amendment which we believe will assist in the proper management of incidentally obtained intelligence. We will speak to those two arms of our amendments during the committee stage of the bill.