QUESTIONS IN WRITING
India: Uranium Exports
(Question No. 5636)
Question

Mr McClelland (Barton)  asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in writing, on 29 March 2007:

(1)
Was he accurately reported in the Australian Financial Review newspaper on 17 January 2007, as saying that “we have been talking with the Indian Government about whether it would be possible to put together some arrangement with India whereby we could export uranium”.
(2)
Can he confirm that India is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
(3)
Could selling uranium to India prejudice the NPT regime.
Answer

Mr Downer (MayoMinister for Foreign Affairs)—The answer to the honourable member’s question is as follows:

(1)
In answer to a question at the Energy, Environment and Air Quality Forum in Los Angeles on 13 January 2007, I stated “We are thinking about it and we have been talking with the Indian Government about whether it would be possible to put together some arrangement with India whereby we could export uranium and be sure that that uranium could only be used for civil purposes – power generation. Not be used in any way, shape or form for military purposes.” I then went on to say: “This whole India issue, it’s a very difficult question because you can have the status quo – or becoming the status quo ante now – where India is not an NPT party, it has nuclear programs, it has nuclear weapons and you can take the view therefore we will have nothing to do with them. Or you can take the view that the Bush Administration has taken that well at least you can embrace some of India’s nuclear industry and you can have inspections by the IAEA – the International Atomic Energy Agency – of some of those nuclear facilities. And some inspections and some transparency is better than none, isn’t it? So that is the debate. I wouldn’t say it’s a fierce debate in Australia. I would say in Australia it’s something that we’re feeling our way on rather cautiously, I think that might be the best answer to your question”.
(2)
Yes. India is not a party to the NPT.
(3)
Current Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) guidelines preclude most forms of nuclear supply to India. The United States has foreshadowed that it will formally ask the NSG to agree to make an exception to its guidelines for India, so as to allow nuclear supply to India. For an exception to the NSG guidelines to be made for India, NSG members would need to be assured that any uranium supplied to India would be subject to safeguards so that it could not be used in India’s military nuclear program but exclusively for India’s civil nuclear power program. With regard to threats to the NPT, it is the Government’s view that the greatest challenges to the NPT come from within: the unresolved cases of non-compliance by North Korea and Iran. India, on the other hand, is a responsible international state with a good record on preventing onwards proliferation of its nuclear materials and technology.