House Hansard 19-Jun-2007 Page 106

Question

Mr McClelland (Barton) asked the Minister for Defence, in writing, on 7 December 2006:

(1): In respect of the comments made at a Senate Estimates hearing of 1 November 2006 by the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) that “anybody in the Iraqi security forces who is involved in ….sectarian violence does need to be removed from their duties”, what procedures does the Australian Defence Force (ADF) have in place for vetting the Iraqi personnel it trains in order to identify people engaged in such violence.
(2): Does the government accept the validity of comments made at the Senate Estimates hearing of 1 November 2006 by the CDF that “we need to develop a more comprehensive strategy against the militias, or the Iraqi Government needs to develop a more comprehensive strategy”; if so, what steps is the Government taking to ensure such strategy development in Australia and with the Iraqi Government.
(3): Does the Government accept the validity of comments made at a recent Senate Estimates hearing of 1 November 2006 by the CDF that “the Iraqi Government needs to confront the issue of militias, probably in a more robust way”; if so, what representations is the Australian Government making to the Iraqi Government to ensure that this occurs.
(4): Does the government accept the validity of CDF comments that sectarian violence is the prime, major and critical challenge facing the Iraq Government; if so, what initiatives is the Government undertaking to deal specifically with this challenge.
(5): Can the Government provide details of intimidation and violence conducted by militia members within the Australian areas of responsibility in Iraq, as alluded to by the CDF at a Senate Estimates hearing of 1 November 2006; if so, (a) how widespread is the intimidation and violence and (b) what measures is the Australian Government taking to combat it.
(6): Which militias are active in the Australian area of responsibility in the south of Iraq and do they have affiliations with any members or groups within the Iraqi Government; if so, which members and which groups.
(7): Is there a risk that Australian troops will be called out to assist Iraqi policing authorities, who may themselves be perpetrators of sectarian violence.
(8): Can the Government confirm a report made on the Dateline program of 25 October 2006 that Iraqi security forces declined to assist members of the Australian contingent during an attack by insurgents; if so, (a) what are the details of the engagement and the actions of the Iraqi security forces; (b) what representations has the Government made to Iraqi authorities about the issue and (c) has this occurred in other situations; if so, what are those details.
(9): Has the Government sought any involvement in the activities of the Iraq Study Group; if not, why not; if so, what involvement has been sought.
(10): What are the procedures in respect of detention and delivery, by Australian military personnel in Iraq, of persons apprehended whilst breaking the law, particularly with regard to (a) handing over of such persons to the Iraqi civilian authorities and (b) any subsequent follow-up procedure to ensure that those persons are not subject to abuse by Iraqi authorities.
(11): What is the legal status of Australian military personnel in Iraq when exercising violent or coercive force in the discharge of their overwatch function; in particular, do they have immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law; if so, what is the basis for that immunity.
(12): What information does the Government have about the following concerns raised by the United States Department of Defense in its report to Congress of August 2006 titled Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: (a) the condoning, or maintenance of support, by certain Iraqi politicians of violence as a source of political leverage; (b) the impeding of defence capabilities by corruption within the ministries and the purging or replacement of experienced or talented employees with party elements/cronies; (c) the emergence of an increasing number of death squads, including those formed from rogue elements of the Iraqi security forces; (d) the attribution of unprofessional and criminal behaviour to certain units in the Iraqi national police force; and (e) the constraint placed upon the development of the Iraqi security forces by corruption, illegal activity and sectarian bias.
(13): What is the Government’s policy on encouraging the governments of surrounding countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria, to become involved in achieving a solution to the violence in Iraq.

Answer

Dr Nelson (Bradfield—Minister for Defence)—The answer to the honourable member’s question is as follows:

(1): The selection and vetting process for Iraqi Security Forces is the remit of the sovereign Iraqi Government, in consultation with the Coalition. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) does not play a role in vetting members of the Iraqi Security Forces.
(2): and (3) The Government agrees that, in taking responsibility for its country’s security, the Iraqi Government must develop a comprehensive strategy and take robust action to combat militia activity. The Australian Government has had ongoing discussions with, and has made representations to, the Iraqi Government on a range of matters, including security.
(4): The Australian Government is concerned by the violence being perpetrated against the Iraqi people. Australia does not have a direct role in combating sectarian violence in Iraq. Australia’s contribution is supporting the Iraqi Government and Coalition by providing training and mentoring for the Iraqi Army and supporting the Iraqi authorities in Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar, where responsibility for security has transferred to Iraqi control.
(5): and (6) The Iraqi authorities have responsibility for security within Australia’s area of operations. Australia provides support to the Iraqi Security Forces in the area through the provision of training and mentoring. I am not in a position to provide details of militia activities within the Australian area of responsibility in southern Iraq.
(7): Any Australian participation in security operations in southern Iraq would require Australian Government approval, following a request from the Iraqi Prime Minister.
(8): During a meeting with Iraqi officials in Al Muthanna province in September 2006 an attack occurred on elements of the Overwatch Battle Group (West) by elements of the anti-coalition forces. Australian forces did not request assistance from Iraqi Security Forces. (a), (b) and (c) Not applicable.
(9): It was a matter for the Iraq Study Group as to who it wished to make submissions. The Australian Government has regular and ongoing close discussions about Iraq with the United States Government and key Coalition partners. The United States administration has made clear that the Iraq Study Group report was one of a number of inputs that fed into the Administration’s review of strategy in Iraq.
(10): Australia has a detailed detention policy for the handling of any detainees, including any subsequent transfer, to ensure that detainees are treated in accordance with Australian standards and international law.
(11): The legal basis for ADF involvement in operations in Iraq is twofold: authorisation under United Nations Security Council resolutions and the continuing consent of the Iraqi Government. United Nations Security Council resolutions 1546 and 1723 authorise the Multi-National Force–Iraq to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. ADF members have immunity from Iraqi civil and criminal courts pursuant to Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17. However, they remain subject to Australian domestic law, including the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982.
(12): Australia does not maintain any independent, unclassified, reporting on the issues detailed in this question.
(13): A stable and secure Iraq is in the interests of its neighbours and the region.